

Problems of Divergent Developments within Indian Nationalism, 1895-1905

ROBERT I. CRANE

University of Michigan

There exists a body of literature which seeks to describe, in rather general terms, the development of nationalism in modern India. The main outlines of political nationalism have been reported, despite certain noteworthy gaps, so that the basic features are visible. Unfortunately, the bulk of the literature has been descriptive and, too often, polemic, rather than analytic and objective. Moreover, attention has been focussed too largely on the Congress Party—seen as a homogeneous or even monolithic structure—and too exclusively at the all-India level. At least two results can by now be noted. First, Indian nationalism has been depicted through a series of generalizations which, though acceptable at one level of explanation, leave a great deal to be desired in terms of depth and precision of interpretation. Second, a host of interesting and important qualifications—in detail—of the over-all situation have been ignored or have remained undiscovered. In short, the picture which emerges from the literature poses as many questions as it answers.¹

Several factors contribute to the inadequacy of the present picture. One of these is the tendency to equate nationalism in India with the nationalism of the Western world in a manner which is both facile and misleading; another is the treatment of Indian nationalism as though it were one and the same thing in all parts of the subcontinent, at all periods of time, and for all classes of Indians. For our purposes, more serious is the tendency to study nationalism for itself, with little or no attempt to analyze its social, cultural, and economic origins or to get at the

social changes which have helped to create nationalism. These approaches are simplistic and tend to distort understanding of the dynamics of development of nationalism as a complex social, political, and intellectual process through time.²

In view of these considerations, it seems advisable to retrace our steps and analyze the growth of nationalism in India so as to account for real and significant divergencies. Such divergencies must be understood if a more accurate and effective concept is to emerge. In this brief paper an attempt will be made to suggest some of the more important divergencies within Indian nationalism and to indicate what their implications for analysis of nationalist growth may be. The focus of analysis will be the underlying social change which has taken place in India in recent decades and which is so crucial to an understanding of the contemporary Indian scene or an understanding of Indian nationalism.

Before discussing the major developmental variations within Indian nationalism, it would seem wise to present an initial definition of nationalism in the subcontinent so we may have an agreed-upon framework for further comment. The proposed definition is as follows:

The nationalist movement in India developed as a response to European contact and domination. This is true in the sense that European education helped to create many of the core ideas of nationalism and in the sense that European rule served to create a number of the preconditions necessary for the growth of national sentiment. Moreover, alien domination produced a reaction amongst Indians regarding those aspects of foreign control which were felt to be intolerable. From this it may be argued that the nationalist leadership—serving as a kind of epitome of Indian response to Europeanization—sought to express or to represent the Indian reaction in such a way as to unite Indian opinion, mobilize public sentiment, formulate popular demands and state nationalist goals and objectives.³

In this definition an effort is made to stress the development of nationalism as a *response* to foreign ideas and foreign domination—a domination which brought about a number of changes in Indian society, in Indian thought, and in the traditional economy of the subcontinent. It should be noted, however, that foreign contact did not create *all* of the conditions necessary for a full-

fledged and widespread Indian nationalism during the early period. The changes induced by foreign rule, it is here argued, were incomplete. This fact by itself suggests limitations upon the development of nationalism in India, limitations which make it misleading to equate that nationalism with the nationalisms created in western Europe as a concomitant of the industrial revolution and the wholesale transformation of European society. Moreover, these limitations help to account for the divergencies within emerging nationalism which form the subject of this study.

There was no single Indian response to Europeanization. Rather, there were many responses from different segments of the population. Some segments were considerably affected by European contact, other elements less so, and still others hardly at all. In addition, the Europeanization process was many-sided, and touched various parts of the indigenous population in different ways.⁴ Thus, emerging nationalism in India had to consist of, or represent, a *variety* of reactions to the variegated experience with the West which was India's lot. In fact, one of the major problems facing the nationalist leadership was the need to *contain* so varied a set of responses within what had, for purposes of effective political action, to strive to become a unified movement.*

Even more basic was the need to create a widespread popular acceptance of the ideal of nationalism. To be effective, the nationalist leadership had to diffuse their doctrine as widely as possible in an environment which was largely unprepared for and in certain respects hostile to the idea of a single nation. The creation of Indian nationalism can be analyzed as a dynamic process, involving tension, action, and reaction between the minority of its proponents and the majority of Indians who were—because of

*Sri Aurobindo made this point quite effectively in an early, and largely overlooked, article he published on the Congress in the pages of the *Indu-Prakash* (Bombay), Aug. 21, 1893, under the title "New Lamps for Old." The article has been reprinted in easily accessible form in H. Mukherjee and U. Mukherjee, *Sri Aurobindo's Political Thought (1893-1908)* (Calcutta: F. Mukhopadhyay, 1958), p. 69-70. "In other words, the necessities of the political movement initiated by the Congress have brought into one place and for a common purpose all sorts and conditions of men, and so by smoothing away the harsher discrepancies between them has created a certain modicum of sympathy between classes that were more or less at variance."

their situation—apathetic, unprepared, or opposed. There were, at the same time, tension and conflict between the proponents of nationalism, sections of which advanced different goals, different strategies, and different justifications for nationalist activity.

There was also the problem that nationalism was but *one* of the possible responses by Indians to European contact and domination. There were, that is to say, aspects of Europeanization which did not create a basis for nationalism or which may—in their effects—have been antithetical to the growth of nationalism in India. European contact did not necessarily create nationalism. From this *mélange* of contrary impulses and effects arose the circumstances and conditions which shaped the course of growth of nationalism and which created those divergencies to which we refer.

But the matter of response to Europeanization is only part of the story. Equally important to the shaping of nationalism in the subcontinent was the fact that India did not comprise a homogeneous and well-knit population, or society—in other than rudimentary respects—prior to the coming of the Europeans. Lacking homogeneity and unity around a concept of statehood or national participation, traditional India was ill-equipped to face the complex process of Europeanization and its differential effects. That there were important unifying implications in foreign domination cannot be denied. That there were, at the same time, effects which did nothing to unify India can also not be denied. Nationalism reflected both tendencies, the unifying and the divergent. Understanding of the moving balance or fluctuation between the two, it is here argued, is necessary if a meaningful analysis is to be achieved.*

*It has, of course, been argued that an essential cultural and religious unity, a common and pervasive tradition, had been created in premodern India. One can select certain culture traits and values which were sufficiently diffused, both vertically and horizontally, through Indian society to give a kind of unity. I will argue, however, that many such instances are irrelevant—at least for the topic at hand—and that the salient fact of life in premodern India was its particularism and localism. Veneration of the cow may well have been one of those rudimentary traits which was common to Indians, but I have seen no convincing argument that it served to unite Indians in any manner which was meaningful for the creation of political unity in a modern nation.

Divergent developments within Indian nationalism may be indicated by citing some of the more obvious ways in which the process of Europeanization evoked varying responses among the Indian people. At the same time, attention can be focussed on the important divergencies in nationalist development which resulted.

To begin with, there was the simple fact of widely varying degrees of contact between Europeans and Indians. The British were never numerous in India, and they tended to cluster in the great port cities such as Bombay and Calcutta, and in a limited number of important inland towns. In such places, Indians, especially those who served the English in some capacity, came in rather frequent contact with the foreigner—whether for good or for ill—while in the vast and populous rural hinterland the appearance of a European was rare.⁵ Similarly, Europeans and European artifacts tended to follow the major arteries of the new, interconnecting system of rails and surfaced roads. The people in the immediate vicinity of these alien instrumentalities were thereby thrown into contact with alien and potentially disturbing traits to a degree unknown by their more isolated countrymen.

As should be apparent, the effect of Europeanization on the indigenous economic system varied widely in degree as well as in kind. Some groups, such as native handicrafters, lost their hereditary occupations and their economic security as a result of the opening of the Indian market to European goods. Certain agriculturists, particularly those who happened to be favorably situated for the cultivation of select cash crops, benefitted materially from the European connection. Some peasants were relatively unaffected by the change to a market economy, while others clearly suffered deprivation and dislocation.⁶ The responses of Indians to European rule varied with their experience in the new economic situation, as did their involvement in emerging nationalism.

Foreign education was a powerful factor in the growth of nationalism in India—probably as important as any other single factor—yet foreign education was spread most *unevenly* throughout India, especially in the period covered by this study.⁷ While exact figures have not been collected for the period in question,

it is clear that only a tiny minority of Indians, certainly no more than one percent, had secured Western higher education prior to 1905. More important, this minority was by no means a random sample of the Indian population. This lack of representativeness was especially marked among those who reached the upper levels of the English system of education established by the British in India. Certain regions, certain communities, certain castes, and certain economic classes had much greater access to Western education or were more willing to pursue Western training. This was true either because location gave them greater access to European centers and to Western educational institutions, or because by historical accident the Europeans were settled for a longer time in their area. Again, it may have been because their community or caste was traditionally more inclined to look upon literacy favorably or had a tradition of literate occupation.* Finally, it may have been because their family was financially better equipped to bear the costs of Western education.

If Western education was the basis for nationalism in India, it is also clear that the various segments of the Indian population had substantially different degrees of access to that education, while certain classes or communities had greater motivation to acquire Western training. The 19th-century renaissance in Bengal, which was not to be duplicated in kind or in intensity elsewhere in India prior to the 20th century, stands as striking testimony to the exceptional experience with Europeans and with Western education which befell the Bengalis as contrasted with other Indians.† Moreover, vocal nationalism, on Western lines, appeared in Bengal sooner than in other parts of India. Bengal clearly had a majority of all Western-educated Indians during

*Certain groups were, for instance, early thrown in close contact with Europeans as their agents, or associates in trade. A knowledge of the English language and of English mercantile and bookkeeping methods would stand these persons or families in good stead, and their sons would be more likely to undertake Western training than would the sons of families not so situated.

†For a discussion of the socio-religious origins of the intellectual renaissance which stirred Bengal and which inspired a new group of spokesmen and authors, see the accounts to be found in A. Rajam, *The National Congress, Its Evolution* (Madras: Sons of India, 1918), pp. 9-16. Also, H. Mukherjee and U. Mukherjee, *The Growth of Nationalism in India* (Calcutta: Presidency Library, 1957), pp. 39-41, 51-57.

the early period as well as a preponderance of the existing institutions of higher education.

It should, however, be noted that Western education had a dual effect. On the one hand, it served as an important unifying agent for those who were its graduates. At the same time, it sharply distinguished the minority group of graduates from the rest of society. That is to say, Indians who received a Western education shared a common and unifying intellectual experience, but a vast gulf was created between the college graduate and the masses. As Professor Aggarwala has put it in commenting on the educated leaders of the early Congress Party:

But in the beginning it [the Congress] was not a movement of the masses. It represented and claimed to speak only for the intelligentsia of the Indian society. It was not even a middle class movement. With the exception of Lokmanya Tilak and possibly a few others, most of its leaders were out of touch with the masses.⁸

This, of course, created a major difficulty for the nationalist leadership in its attempt to secure a popular following. The Westernized intelligentsia was imbued with values and goals derived from English education which were virtually unintelligible, at least at certain critical points, to the masses they sought to lead. Western training turned the attention of its devotees to Western ideals and institutions which were alien to Indian experience. Two recent authors have pointed this up in discussing the role of Aurobindo Ghose in the development of Indian nationalism and his opposition to the early Congress leadership:

He [Aurobindo] felt the utter unsoundness of recognizing England as the sole exemplar of India's political progress. He found the Congress politics rooted in shallow earth, divorced from the historic traditions of the country. He felt the need of introducing new blood into the body of the Congress and revitalizing it by calling the masses into it. . . . At Baroda he felt his breach with the Congress widening with the degree of his Indianisation growing as its natural consequence. He found the Congress too much Occidental in outlook and temper, fixed in its narrow ideals. . . .⁹

In short, the intelligentsia tended to petition Parliament for redress of grievances such as the lack of Indian representation in the Legislative Councils. This was hardly a topic calculated to

arouse an illiterate peasantry who had never heard of parliaments, legislatures, or electoral colleges.

But there is more to the story than the effect of Western education in separating the new elite from the tradition-bound masses. Western education did not affect all recipients in the same way, even though it represented a common intellectual experience. It is incorrect to think of a *single* response to the alien values and methods inculcated by the English system of education. While much more research needs to be done on Indian responses to Western training, it is possible to discern at least two major variants among the responses of the Western-educated. Each of these types of response was to bear fruit in its effect upon the kind of nationalism espoused by the persons involved.

Of these the first may be called the "modernist" or "reformist" response, while the second can be described as "traditionalist" or "revivalist." Neither of these polar response-types can be overlooked if we are to understand the contrary trends implicit in the evolution of Indian nationalism. Both of these responses, so contradictory in their assumptions, values, and objectives, can be identified quite clearly among those who received Western education and among the nationalist leaders.*

The modernist or reformist response was dominant among the founders of the Indian Association and of the better-known Congress Party and has remained a major element of these associations down to the present day. In the period under discussion, the representatives of the reformist viewpoint comprised the Moderate group within the Congress and set the tone for the Congress movement. The Moderates valued the British connection with India and wanted to preserve that connection. They were as interested in social reform, along Western lines, as in political ad-

*Unfortunately, to complicate matters, one can make no neat and consistent dichotomy between reformers and revivalists. Some leaders seemed to combine features of both positions in themselves, so as to hold one position on certain matters and the other position on other matters. Also, some leaders changed camps during their careers. Some began and earned fame as traditionalists only to become modernists later in life. It is my view that this reflects the complexity of the mixture of Western and indigenous values in recent India. Presumably, for purposes of analysis, the most fruitful procedure will be to place the representatives of the various viewpoints along a continuum, to locate and demark clusters of views along the continuum, and to use the information as the basis for creation of a typology.

vancement and sought a voice in government so as to be able to facilitate the renovation and modernization of India. Of them, Sir Henry Cotton, a senior official in the Indian Civil Service, once said:

They are loyal in that they appreciate the advantages of British rule, and are grateful to the British government for the benefits which have been conferred upon them. . . . But they are embittered, deeply embittered, at their exclusion from power. . . . They claim that the Government should repose confidence in them, and not shrink from raising them to the highest posts in civil and military life. They demand real, not nominal, equality, a voice in the government of their own country, and a career in the public service.¹⁰

The Hindu traditionalist or revivalist response to Western values also became a prominent factor in nationalist circles during the period prior to 1905 and has remained a part of the political scene since that time. The revivalists who entered the Congress clustered in the so-called Extremist wing of that organization and sought to wrest control of the Congress from the Moderates.

The revivalists reacted against Western education as a perceived threat to their values, their social system, and their ancient religion. The revivalist response was given its first systematic statement by Swami Dayanand Saraswati, who founded the Arya Samaj as a militant defense organization for Hinduism.¹¹ His movement was based upon a return to the *Vedas* and a denunciation of Western-style reforms.

Swami Dayanand, however, based it [the Arya Samaj] on the bedrock of the Vedas. It was Hinduism pure and aggressive. Naturally, therefore, it fostered more pride in the country, and the feeling it fostered of the purity and greatness of Hinduism was bound to have an encouraging and elevating effect on a people weighed down with a consciousness of their own inferiority.¹²

It was, however, Bal Tilak, the Poona Brahmin, who made revivalist nationalism a powerful force within Indian nationalism. Tilak, leader of the Extremists, was the fiery editor of two prominent nationalist newspapers. Through these organs, Tilak pressed his nationalist and revivalist propaganda and developed his ideas for quickening national self-consciousness by use of

religious themes. Tilak was one of the first to make genuine efforts to spread nationalism as a doctrine among the uneducated villagers and residents of the small *mofussil* towns. In 1893 he launched the popular Hindu Ganpati Festival and, shortly thereafter, the Shivaji Festival. In these festivals, Hindu students and other youth learned the secret of organized action in defense of their Motherland.¹³

Thus there were at least two major variants of response to Western training, which were reflected in major and contradictory movements within developing nationalism. The two were diametrically opposite, for the first embraced Western science and logic, modernization and secular democracy, while the second turned back to Hinduism, or to the sacred books such as the *Vedas*, for justification of the Indian way of life against the challenge of the West.¹⁴ Within the nationalist movement the result was the creation of rival organizations and bitter contest over the direction to be taken by nationalism and by the Congress.

The kinds of divergencies already mentioned by no means exhaust the list. Understanding the growth of nationalism in the subcontinent requires analysis of the role of other divergent or conflicting impulses, each of which had somehow to be contained within nationalism if the carefully built edifice was not to be torn asunder. Study of these contrary impulses sharpens our insight and helps to explain what may loosely be called the "dialectic" of nationalist development.

Perhaps the most obvious and best known instance of widely divergent development in the course of evolution of nationalism in the subcontinent was the rise of a clearly separatist Muslim nationalism which led to the subsequent partitioning of the subcontinent between India and Pakistan. The rise of Muslim nationalism in India and its complete separation from what may be called the main stream of Nationalist evolution among the non-Muslims is, however, a special case and merits full-scale study in its own right. In this essay it is not possible to include more than a very few comments on Muslim separatism.¹⁵

Muslim separatism in India reflected several of the divergencies inherent in the modern Indian scene. There was, for instance, difference between the religious, social, and cultural

tradition of Islam and that of Hinduism. In addition, the Muslims as a community clearly had less access to—and probably less motivation for—Western education than the communities of Hindus. The difference between the percent of Muslims who had received high Western education prior to 1905 and the percent of Hindus with similar training is very striking, with a much larger proportion of Hindus being among the Western-trained. This meant, *inter alia*, a serious difference, at least from the point of view of the Muslims, in Muslim access to government employment at any level. It also put the Muslims at a disadvantage in the contest for elected office when representative institutions began to be established in the subcontinent. It is noteworthy that the Muslim League first coalesced around the issue of separate representation for Muslims in legislative councils.

By and large, the Muslim areas of India were more isolated from large-scale European habitation than were the predominantly Hindu areas. The Northwest Frontier region, a Muslim heartland, was among the last regions of India to come under effective British administration and substantial British contact. Unlike many groups among the Hindus, few Muslims were members of commercial or clerical groupings which soon found reason for sustained contact with the British. Among the Muslim leaders, a substantial element were rural landlords who had comparatively little reason to pursue Western knowledge or to become involved in Western patterns of behavior. On a number of scores, then, the Muslims lagged behind the Hindus in their exposure to Western ways and in their acceptance of the new system of power and of education. By the end of the 19th century, Muslim leadership had become acutely aware of the ensuing disadvantages, and the tendency toward a separate Muslim nationalism became pronounced. British policy, in certain respects, favored this result. The central point, however, is that situational factors underlay this prominent divergence within emerging nationalism.

Nationalism in India has usually been viewed as an all-India phenomenon, and it is correct to say that it played an all-India role and frequently had all-India goals. Nonetheless, a consistent and significant aspect of nationalism has been the conflict or dissonance between a deep-seated regionalism and parochialism on

the one hand and Indian nationalism on the other. This regionalism, in part, reflected the previously noted fact that Western contact was more persistent and effective in some areas than in others. But it also reflected prominent characteristics of traditional Indian society which emphasized local group and community cohesion. In addition, regionalism of a socio-cultural and economic character—so typical of a traditional society—was reinforced by the existence of separate, major languages which were regionally based.* Prior to the 20th century, regionalism was given added potency by the virtual absence of an adequate system of transportation and communications on an all-India basis. Movement out of one's own locality was difficult and expensive.

In the late 19th century, regionalism was one of the most distinctive characteristics of the growing nationalism. In those years it was probably more accurate to speak of Bengali nationalism, of Maharashtrian nationalism, or of Punjabi nationalism, than to speak of Indian nationalism. Without understanding the role of Bengali nationalism or of Punjabi nationalism, as well as the intricate links which developed around certain issues *between* the two, we shall not understand the complex process which brought Indian nationalism into being. Some work has been done on the basis of provincial nationalism in India, but very little has been done to analyze the emergence of interconnections between provincial forces. The latter created a delicately balanced all-India nationalism and structured it in certain ways.

Another divergence in the growth of nationalism has been between the interests, objectives, and attitudes of the urban sector of Indian society and those of the rural sector. Nationalism meant certain things to the people in the cities—where the literacy rate was higher and where the Western factory system and business enterprise were concentrated—and rather different things to the masses who lived, as had their forefathers, in the traditionalist,

*In quite recent years the Government of India has had to face the fact of regional and linguistic provincialism which has, on occasion, erupted into violence. Bombay has, for example, witnessed strife between speakers of Marathi and of Gujarati. On this topic, see Selig Harrison, *The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). Also, Joan Bondurant, *Regionalism versus Provincialism: A Study in Problems of Indian National Unity* (Berkeley: University of California, 1958, Indian Press Digests-Monograph Series, No. 4).

agrarian villages.¹⁶ This would have been the case, if for no other reason, because it was in the cities that the nascent middle class congregated. Moreover, almost all of the nationalist newspapers were published in the cities, and their readership was predominantly urban. Town residents became aware of European political ideas and instrumentalities sooner and more directly than did millions in rural areas.*

Urban interests in support of nationalism were different from those of the rural population. The mercantile and early industrial magnates of India supported nationalism because of the conflict, real or potential, between their enterprise and that of the British. This was essentially an urban phenomenon, while the class which wanted government employment was largely urban rather than rural. The ease and practicability of organization and of combination was much greater in the cities and towns than in the half million villages. For years the bulk of the resolutions passed by the annual Congress sessions were concerned with issues which were primarily of interest to the city-dwellers, while most of the delegates to the various Congress sessions were from towns. In addition, the rural-based landlords tended to develop their own political associations and to shy away from the Congress.

In the period up to the Partition of Bengal, this dichotomy posed a major problem for the growth of nationalism. The nationalist message was confined largely to the towns. But if there was to be an Indian nationalism, the rural majority had to be involved. The nationalist leadership of that period was, by and large, incapable of appealing to the villagers in terms that would rouse them. The search for an effective appeal to the village was to have a profound effect at a later date.

This paper is not designed to extend the list of divergent developments, but rather to indicate their nature and their significance for an adequate understanding of nationalism as a

*After World War I, Mahatma Gandhi "revolutionized" Indian nationalism by carrying it for the first time in any effective fashion to the villages. Tilak had made efforts in this direction in Maharashtra before Gandhi, and Sri Aurobindo had dwelt upon the importance of such a development, but Tilak's attempt was premature and he failed to develop a consistent and effective rural appeal on other than a local basis.

complex development. Its aim is to lay the basis for analysis of the effects of social change upon the kinds of nationalism which emerged. In this connection it envisages creation of a typology for the variety of nationalisms which arose in modern India.

Nationalism has been described as a general phenomenon attributable to Indians, but such a view is neither useful nor tenable. That view robs scholarship of significant vantage points from which to pose crucial questions regarding the interplay of factors in the emergence of nationalism. At the same time it leaves unexamined certain fragilities which continue to be important in Indian nationalism in the more recent period.

NOTES

1. Reference is made to such standard titles as: B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress* (2 vols.; Bombay: Padma Publications, 1946); V. P. Raghuvanshi, *Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought* (Agra: L. Agarwal, 1951); C. Y. Chintamani, *Indian Politics since the Mutiny* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1940); R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, and K. Datta, *An Advanced History of India* (2nd ed.; London: Macmillan, 1950).
2. An effort to study the development of Indian nationalism in terms of "stages of growth" has been made by R. I. Crane, "The Leadership of the Congress Party," in R. L. Park and I. Tinker (eds.), *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 169-187.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
4. I have discussed this matter in two previous articles: "India: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization," *Social Education*, XV (1951), 365-371; "Strata Disruption and Social Change in South Asia," *United Asia*, VI (1954), 228-234. See also the discussions in K. Chattopadhyay (ed.), *Study of Changes in Traditional Culture* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1957).
5. Bernard Cohn has recently demonstrated the process by which certain Indians were thrown in close juxtaposition with the Europeans and/or served as agents to the Europeans. In his view a new class was thus created which, at the least, had a special interest in the maintenance of the British connection. See his article: "The Initial British Impact on India: A Case Study of the Benares Region," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XIX (1950), 418-431. The article stresses the fact that members of this group opposed the nationalist objectives of the English-educated and urbanized Indians.
6. The uneven and varied effect of English rule on Indian agrarian society is well documented in T. F. Shea, "The Land System of Malabar and Its Influence upon Capital Formation in Agriculture" (unpublished dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1959).
7. B. T. McCully, *English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), presents an invaluable account of the spread of Western education in India and its effects. Also,

- R. N. Aggarwala, *National Movement and Constitutional Development of India* (Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co., 1956), p. 35: "... none can deny that the first demand for self-governing institutions in India came from those who had acquired the western education."
8. R. N. Aggarwala, *op. cit.*, p. 42. Also, M. A. Buch, *Rise and Growth of Indian Militant Nationalism* (Baroda: Atmaram Press, 1940), p. 6-7: "The [early] Congress movement was not a popular movement. The leaders did not care to enlist popular enthusiasm or interest. The movement was therefore confined deliberately to the intelligentsia only."
 9. H. Mukherjee and U. Mukherjee, *Sri Aurobindo's Political Thought (1893-1908)* (Calcutta: F. Mukhopadhyay, 1958), p. 22. Also M. Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 43: "Mass movements require mass leaders, and the Congress politicians, with a few exceptions, had so far specialized in the leadership of academic audiences. Tilak [by contrast] had been working with the people, addressing his appeal to them in a language which they could understand. . . ."
 10. Sir Henry Cotton, *New India: or, India in Transition* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1907), pp. 40-41.
 11. For the life of Swami Dayanand see the biography by Har B. Sarda, *Life of Dayanand Saraswati* (Ajmere: Vedic Yantiakaya, 1946).
 12. A. Rajam, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
 13. Several volumes have been published recently on Tilak. See D. V. Tahmankar, *Lokamanya Tilak, Father of Indian Unrest* (London: John Murray, 1956). Also, M. Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 125, speaking of the religious festivals organized by Tilak, says, "Tilak was thus able to effect the union of the new political spirit with the tradition and sentiment of the historic past and of both with the ineradicable religious temperament of the people, of which these festivals were the symbol."
 14. Another division in the ranks of nationalism was represented by the formation and long-time existence of the Indian Association, founded in Calcutta in 1876. Though the Indian Association at times worked rather closely with the Congress, it generally preferred its own course of action. For a useful historical account, see J. C. Bagal, *History of the Indian Association, 1876-1951* (Calcutta: H. N. Mazumdar, 1953).
 15. The material in print on Muslim nationalism is rather limited and is generally less adequate than the material on the Congress or on "Hindu" nationalism. No substantial study of Muslim nationalism has as yet been published. However, for general insights, see: Sir H. V. Lovett, *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement* (New York: F. A. Stokes, 1920); W. R. Smith, *Nationalism and Reform in India* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938); W. C. Smith, *The Muslim League, 1942-45* (Lahore: Minerva Book Shop, 1945), as well as his major volume, *Modern Islam in India* (Lahore: Ripon Press, 1947).
 16. I have discussed the scope of urbanism in India and some of the significant differences between the Indian urban and rural milieus in "Urbanism in India," *American Journal of Sociology*, LX (1955), 463-470. Sir Henry Cotton, *op. cit.*, has also remarked on the gap between the urban and rural milieus in India.